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Abstract 
 
Crimes and conflicts are seriously undermining African development. This article 
assesses the best governance tools in the fight against the scourges. The following findings are 
established. (1) Democracy, autocracy and voice & accountability have no significant 
negative correlations with crime. (2)  The increasing relevance of government quality in the 
fight is as follows: regulation quality, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law 
and corruption-control. (3) Corruption-control is the most effective mechanism in fighting 
crimes (conflicts). The findings are significantly strong when controlling for age dependency, 
number of police (and security) officers, per capita economic prosperity, educational level and 
population density. Justifications for the edge of corruption-control (as the most effective 
governance tool) and policy implications are discussed.  
JEL Classification: F52; K42; O17; O55; P16 
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1. Introduction  
  
Crime substantially undermines African development by, inter alia, eroding social and 
human capital, infringing on social and political stability and driving-up the cost of doing 
business. Since time immemorial, governments have been expected to improve the quality of 
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life and wellbeing of their citizens by protecting the lives and property of these citizens from 
crime and conflicts. Accordingly, a sustainable macroeconomic growth path as a means of 
meeting the above ends could be seriously stifled by poor government quality, especially 
corruption (Mauro, 1995). This has led to a recent strand of studies focusing on the 
fundamental issue of the relationship between government quality and wellbeing (Helliwell & 
Huang 2008; Ott 2010; Yamamura et al., 2012).  
 Over the past decades, the concern of crimes (and conflicts) and the search for 
solutions to tackle their corrosive effects has seen renewed interest as an issue of public 
debate and criterion by which civil society takes stock of leadership. This growing interest has 
been motivated by the soaring realization among international development experts that, 
development requires above all, socio-economic security and government quality. 
Accordingly, recommendations on sound policies, well intentioned incentives and aid efforts 
may not achieve the desired objectives unless they are offered in an environment that 
stimulates self-sustaining growth and development. More so, there is also a mounting 
realization that unsustainable policies are not always the product of deficiency in knowledge 
on what best policies should be. Instead, these policies could result just as much from decision 
makers distorting economic policies (poor governance), in an atmosphere where impunity, 
criminality and conflicts are orders of the day. As far as we have reviewed, the African 
continent broadly reflects the concerns highlighted above.  
 African development is substantially being retarded by consistent waves of crimes and 
conflicts. The institutional environment in Africa over the past decades has been seriously 
plagued by violence, crimes and conflicts (The Darfur humanitarian tragedy, Kenyan post 
election crises in 2007/2008, Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown, Nigeria’s marred transition in 
2008, the Ivorian political crisis, the unending Egyptian revolution  and long-standing issue of 
Somalia as a failed state, recent coups d’états in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, the mounting 
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rebellion in the Central African Republic and inter alia, most recently, the Malian crisis that is 
currently mobilizing international military resources). One of the reasons advanced for this 
plethora of conflicts is the absence of good governance, with corruption assuming central 
stage. In fact, corruption has been conceived as a crime against African development (Furphy, 
2010), a position first raised in 2009 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) Southern Africa representative, and confirmed by Transparency International’s 
(TI’s) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of October 2010 that identified Africa as the most 
corrupt region in the world. This has recently led to a growing strand of studies on African 
corruption
1
.   
 To the best of our knowledge, a great chunk of governance oriented studies has been 
corruption-oriented
2
. In fact, governance oriented studies have seldom explored all the 
available government quality dynamics provided by the World Bank. The link between crime 
rates and macro governance has been essentially focused on the relationship between 
corruption and crime (Lederman et al., 2004) or nexuses among corruption, crime and police 
                                                 
1
 In response to the above issues, there has been a renewed interest in the role of corruption in African 
development. The perilous character of development assistance (Asongu, 2012a); how existing corruption-
control levels (Asongu, 2013a) in the presence of wealth-effects (Asongu, 2013b) matter in the fight against the 
scourge; its detrimental character on stock market performance dynamics (Asongu, 2012b); the status of 
corruption-control as the most effective tool in the battle against the burgeoning phenomenon of African 
software piracy (Asongu & Andrés, 2013); the anatomy, causes and consequences of corruption (Kodila-Tekida, 
2013, 2012ab); the nexus between alcohol and corruption (Kodila-Tekida, 2012c), inter alia. 
2
 There has been a heated debate on the socio-economic consequences, with findings establishing: no effects
2
, 
negative effects (Mauro, 1995; Mo 2001; Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011) or positive effects
2
 on economic growth and 
investment; slightly weak effect of corruption on economic growth through investment (Mauro, 1997); negative 
incidence in investment-focused studies (Mauro, 1997; Brunetti et al., 1998; Aysan et al., 2007; Baliamoune-
Lutz & Ndikumana, 2007; Everhart et al., 2009); perilous impact on foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000a) and 
bank credit (Wei, 2000b; Wei & Wu, 2001; Ahlin & Pang, 2008) in capital flows studies; negative quality (Tanzi 
& Davoodi, 1997) and return (Haque & Kneller, 2008; De la Croix & Delavallade, 2007) of public expenditure, 
especially in military (Gupta et al., 2001) and general (education, health and public) services (Delavallade, 2006) 
and; the deterioration of government income (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Ghura, 1998; Friedman et al., 2000; 
Blackburn et al., 2008). Socio-economic effects of corruption have also been documented in the debates, with: 
pros
2
 and neutrals (You & Khagram, 2005) on the negative incidences on inequality and poverty and; the 
disincentive of the scourge to education in terms of years of schooling (Mo, 2001), registration rates (Dreher & 
Herzfeld, 2005; Mokaddem, 2010) and prospects of furthering education to postgraduate and research levels 
(Kodila-Tedika, 2012b). Other consequences of corruption assessed in the literature include, inter alia: negative 
business climate (Dzhumashev, 2009) and corporate productivity (De Rosa et al., 2010); the establishment of 
underground and shadow economies (Friedman et  al., 2000); political instability (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004); 
peril to trade (Abe & Wilson,  2008); environmental degradation (Smith et al., 2003; Welsch, 2004; Barbier, 
2010) and; the possibility of criminal activities (Azfar & Gurgur, 2004;  Azfar, 2005). 
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(Azfar & Gurgur, 2008; Hunt, 2006). With the above background, this study is a direct 
response to a twofold international concern that has signaled the need for urgent action and 
concerted efforts: the growing incidences of organized crime, corruption, terrorism and; the 
debilitating effects these problems have on peace, security and development in Africa (Moshi, 
2007). Hence, the principal line of inquiry of this paper is to investigate why the importance 
of fighting corruption has been central to governance issues. To this end, this study assesses 
best governance tools in the fight against crimes and conflicts in Africa. The methodological 
framework is consistent with the empirical underpinnings of Asongu & Andrés (2013) who 
have recently investigated governance tools that matter in the fight against African software 
piracy.  
The contribution of this paper to existing literature is fourfold. Firstly, it deviates from 
the recent substantial bulk of literature that has focused only on corruption in the African 
institutional literature and integrates previously missing government quality dynamics (rule of 
law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, political stability, voice & accountability, 
corruption-control, democracy and autocracy) in the assessment of African wellbeing. 
Secondly, as far as we have reviewed, with the absence of studies that directly target measures 
of addressing the prevailing waves of conflicts (crimes), a corollary of the above contribution 
is the assessment of best governance tools in the fight against African conflicts (crimes). 
Hence, in the heat of the ongoing debate on African conflicts, we attempt to provide policy 
makers with the much needed guidance on which governance tools to prioritize in policy 
decision making processes. Thirdly, the use of recent data presents findings with more 
updated and focused policy implications. Fourthly, the study unites two strands of the African 
institutional development literature by analyzing bad governance sources of crimes (conflicts) 
and, at the same time responding to the effectiveness of policies needed to mitigate conflicts 
in Africa.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the current climate of 
and nexuses among crime, conflict and governance in Africa. Section 3 discusses the data and 
outlines the methodology. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. We conclude with 
Section 5.  
 
2. Crimes, conflicts, governance and development in Africa  
 
 There is a twofold international concern that has signaled the need for concerted 
action:  the growing incidences of organized crime, corruption, terrorism and; the debilitating 
effects these problems have on peace, security and development in Africa (Moshi, 2007). The 
UNODC study on crime and development in Africa has substantially documented the 
emergence of organized crime in the continent and its links to conflicts (UNODC, 2005a). It 
notes that the growth in international commerce and transport has made Africa, with its weak 
law enforcement capacity, an ideal conduit via which to extract and trans-ship a range of 
illicit goods. According to a strand of studies, organized criminal networks have succeeded in 
establishing a common criminal market for illicit commodities that cover the entire southern 
African sub-region (Gastrow, 2001). There are substantially well documented examples of 
organized criminal groups corrupting, colluding with and/or penetrating state structures. The 
manner in which criminal activities of West African crime networks have operated has 
attracted world attention because their activities have had a global effect (UNODC, 2005b).  
 Crime undermines development by: eroding Africa’s social and human capital; 
affecting social and political stability; driving-up the cost of business, hence driving 
investment and business away from the continent and; undermining the ability governments to 
promote development.  The proceeds of crime breed corruption, which in-turn facilitate the 
prosperity of criminal networks and debilitate enforcement efforts. According to Goredema 
(2003), in developing countries (especially Africa), with under-resourced and weak 
governments, this can lead to consequences which exacerbate distrust in democratic, social 
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and financial institutions. Accordingly, pervasive corruption is perhaps the most damaging 
element affecting good governance and development (Moshi, 2007). Poverty alleviation 
programs are frequently undermined by corruption and the inability of existing institutions to 
monitor the implementation of policies and rules that tackle it.  With respect to Moshi (2007), 
the African poverty trap could therefore embody a range of mutually reinforcing economic 
and social perils, all of which require targeted interventions if the pace is to be maintained and 
the vicious cycle broken. However, according to Moshi (2003) in order to achieve this, it is 
worthwhile to acknowledge and recognize Africa’s special needs and constraints. The 
objective of this paper is to look at how institutional constraints matter in the fight against the 
highlighted criminal networks and resulting conflicts.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
  
We assess a sample of 38 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) 
Due to data availability constraints, the structure is cross-sectional with 2009-2010 averages. 
Variables definitions and corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 3. The main 
dependent variable of crime proxied by the level of internally organized conflict is obtained 
from the IEP.  
The choice of independent variables is consistent with recent African institutional 
literature (Asongu & Andrés, 2013) that is based on the IMF (2005) conception and definition 
of good governance. Accordingly, eight governance indicators are employed, notably: voice 
and accountability (the degree to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in the 
political decision making process); political stability and absence of violence (which 
measures the stability of a government to political violence and terrorism); government 
effectiveness (that measures the capability of a government to implement effective policies 
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and maintain credibility);  regulatory quality (that appreciates the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies that encourage private sector participation);  rule of 
law (that accounts for  the existence of a good legal system including property rights and 
enforcement of contracts); control of corruption (which appreciates the degree to which 
public power is diverted from private gain); democracy (which is a form of government in 
which all eligible citizens have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives) and; 
autocracy (that refers to a system of government where one person has absolute powers). 
These governance indicators for the most part range from –2.5 (the weakest institution) to 2.5 
(the strongest institution).  
Selected control variables include: the number of internal security officers and police 
per 100 000 people (police), age dependency ratio of the young as a % of working-age 
population (age), per capita economic prosperity (GDP per capita), primary school 
enrollment ratio as a % of gross enrollment (education) and, population density in terms of 
people per square km of land area (population). From intuition, we expect the first four 
control variables to mitigate crime while the last should increase it. Expectedly, the police is a 
natural deterrent to crime, increased dependency (age) increases the possibility of petty crime 
but not of internal conflict that can only be effectively organized by adults, per capita 
economic prosperity (GDP per capita) and literacy (education) naturally mitigate options of 
resorting to criminal activities for subsistence, whereas population density (population) 
without a corresponding increase in the number of security (and police) officers could 
seriously fuel criminal activities. Moreover, from intuition, cities with higher population 
densities may create greater returns to crime because criminals may have greater access to the 
wealthy and face a greater density of victims. Additionally, urban density makes it harder for 
the police to track criminals, which lead to lower possibilities of recognition and lower 
probability of arrest.  
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Details about the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis (showing the basic 
correlations among variables used in this study) are presented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
respectively.  The summary statistics of the variables show that, there is quite a degree of 
variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated 
relationships would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate concerns of 
overparametization and multicolinearity. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
Owing to the cross-sectional structure of the dataset, we adopt a heteroscedasticity 
consistent Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique. For further robustness 
purposes, we employ Ramsey’s Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET)3. The 
methodological specification typically follows the empirical underpinnings of Asongu & 
Andrés (2013) who have used the same framework to address the issue of which governance 
tools matter in the fight against African software piracy.  
Two major issues may arise from the choice of this estimation strategy: (1) the 
concern of different measurement units in the governance variables that could make the 
comparison of regressions coefficients from different models unfeasible and; (2) the 
alternative of using ‘standardized regression coefficients’ in one regression model consisting 
of all proposed government quality variables. In order to clear misgivings about the two 
issues, three facts are worth pointing-out. Firstly, the perception based government quality 
measures do not have different measurement units, as justified by almost similar descriptive 
statistics properties (see Appendix 1). It is also worth noting that, the main advantage 
‘standard coefficients’ proponents present is that, the coefficients take account of the 
independent variable’s scale of unit which makes comparisons easy. Secondly, due to issues 
                                                 
3
 Ramsey’s RESET is a general specification test for a linear model that tests whether non-linear combinations of 
the fitted values help explain the response variable. The intuition behind the test is that, if non-linear 
combinations of the explaining variables have any explanatory power in the response variable, the model is 
misspecified.  
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of multicolinearity and overparametization, the government quality measures cannot be 
regressed in the same model because they are highly correlated (See Appendix 2). Even after 
standardizing the measures, these issues still persist. Thirdly, from an intuitive standpoint, 
different regression models with identical specifications are comparable. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
 
4.1 Presentation of results  
 
 Table 1 below presents the estimation results. While Panel A entails results without 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard error errors, those of Panel 
B are HAC standard errors consistent. While autocorrelation may intuitively not be an issue 
(owing to the cross-sectional data structure), some substantial differences (in magnitude and 
significance) in estimated coefficients across panels indicate that, the issue of 
heteroscedasticity represents a significant noise that should be taken into account in the 
estimations. Hence, interpretation, discussion and resulting policy recommendations will be 
based essentially on Panel B.  
 The following findings could be established. (1) All government quality dynamics 
have the expected signs, meaning they either significantly or insignificantly tackle African 
crimes and conflicts. (2) While five governance tools are significant in tackling the issues, 
three governance mechanisms are not. Significant government quality dynamics include, the 
rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, political stability and corruption-
control; while the insignificant mechanisms are, voice & accountability, democracy and 
autocracy. (3) The relevance of governance tools in the fight against the scourges (in 
increasing order) is as follows: regulation quality (-0.566), government effectiveness (-0.674), 
political stability (-0.853), rule of law (-0.923) and corruption-control (-1.046). (4) 
Surprisingly, corruption-control substantially outweighs political stability (no violence) as the 
most effective governance mechanism in the fight against crime and conflicts. (5) The null 
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hypothesis of Ramsey’s RESET is overwhelmingly not rejected, implying the model is not 
misspecified because nonlinear combinations of the explaining variables have no explanatory 
power on the outcome variable.  
Most of the significant control variables have the right signs. ‘Growth in GDP per 
capita’, ‘age dependency’ and ‘population density’ are negatively correlated with crime. 
Accordingly, per capita economic prosperity naturally decreases options of resorting to 
criminal activities as means of subsistence. Increased age dependency substantially shapes 
parental behavior on the choice of criminal road maps as ways forward (see discussion on 
control variables in the data section). The sign of population density is contrary to our 
expectations, as higher population densities intuitively come with greater returns on crime. 
This unexpected significance (that is valid in only one of the eight models) could be due to, 
inter alia: policies that increase police density in tandem with population density and; increase 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) that indirectly regulate crime rate.   
Table 1: Impact of governance tools on Crime (Conflict)  
 Dependent variable: Crime (Conflict) 
 Panel A: Analysis without HAC standard errors  
Constant  5.991*** 6.868*** 7.550*** 7.966*** 2.887 7.322*** 8.779*** 8.522*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law  -0.923*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002)        
Regulation Quality  --- -0.566* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.054)       
Government   Effectiveness  --- --- -0.674** --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.036)      
Voice & Accountability  --- --- --- -0.404 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.106)     
Political Stability  --- --- --- --- -0.853*** --- --- --- 
     (0.000)    
Corruption-Control  --- --- --- --- --- 0.161 --- --- 
      (0.269)   
Democracy  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.025 --- 
       (0.601)  
Autocracy  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.034 
        (0.552) 
Police 0.116 0.055 0.057 0.066 0.045 0.161 0.029 0.016 
 (0.437) (0.730) (0.722) (0.691) (0.712) (0.306) (0.864) (0.924) 
Age  -0.016 -0.013 -0.020 -0.011 -0.003 -0.023** -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.139) (0.290) (0.108) (0.352) (0.704) (0.035) (0.280) (0.270) 
GDP per capita  -0.309* -0.348* -0.417** -0.493** -0.104 -0.452*** -0.492** -0.444** 
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.027) (0.011) (0.502) (0.006) (0.016) (0.031) 
Education  -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.527) (0.294) (0.444) (0.329) (0.549) (0.597) (0.284) (0.217) 
Population density  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0009 
 (0.888) (0.935) (0.903) (0.500) (0.237) (0.956) (0.604) (0.686) 
         
Adjusted R² 0.364 0.230 0.247 0.202 0.552 0.422 0.139 0.141 
Fisher  4.538*** 2.851** 3.028** 2.569** 8.613*** 5.513*** 1.999* 2.017* 
Ramsey  RESET  0.097 0.143 0.048 0.526 0.341 0.294 0.055 0.067 
 (0.907) (0.867) (0.953) (0.596) (0.714) (0.747) (0.946) (0.935) 
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 Panel B: Analysis with HAC standard errors 
Constant  5.991*** 6.868*** 7.550*** 7.966*** 2.887* 7.322*** 8.779*** 8.522*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law  -0.923*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)        
Regulation Quality  --- -0.566** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.047)       
Government   Effectiveness  --- --- -0.674** --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.034)      
Voice & Accountability  --- --- --- -0.404 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.200)     
Political Stability  --- --- --- --- -0.853*** --- --- --- 
     (0.000)    
Corruption-Control  --- --- --- --- --- -1.046*** --- --- 
      (0.000)   
Democracy  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.025 --- 
       (0.616)  
Autocracy  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.034 
        (0.542) 
Police 0.116 0.055 0.057 0.066 0.045 0.161 0.029 0.016 
 (0.470) (0.746) (0.740) (0.706) (0.736) (0.305) (0.862) (0.924) 
Age  -0.016 -0.013 -0.020** -0.011 -0.003 -0.023** -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.124) (0.231) (0.048) (0.327) (0.682) (0.024) (0.189) (0.171) 
GDP per capita  -0.309* -0.348** -0.41*** -0.49*** -0.104 -0.452*** -0.49*** -0.444*** 
 (0.051) (0.020) (0.005) (0.001) (0.405) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) 
Education  -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.358) (0.149) (0.320) (0.257) (0.389) (0.441) (0.221) (0.185) 
Population density  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.001* -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0009 
 (0.833) (0.907) (0.845) (0.392) (0.083) (0.925) (0.498) (0.577) 
         
R² 0.364 0.230 0.247 0.202 0.552 0.422 0.139 0.141 
Fisher  8.033*** 5.788*** 5.530*** 5.284*** 12.182*** 11.594*** 4.831*** 4.908*** 
Ramsey  RESET  0.097 0.143 0.048 0.526 0.341 0.294 0.055 0.067 
 (0.907) (0.867) (0.953) (0.596) (0.714) (0.747) (0.946) (0.935) 
         
*,**,***: significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. RESET: Regression 
Equation Specification Error Test.  
 
4.2 Discussion of results 
  
Before we dive into the discussion of the results, it is interesting the underline the 
intuition motivating this study. The waves of conflicts, violence and crimes in the African 
continent are seriously limiting sustainable development. A substantial bulk of the 
development literature in general and African institutional literature in particular has focused 
on corruption (in terms of anatomy, causes and consequences). While there is some evidence 
on the relationship between governance and crime, very little is known about how governance 
tools matter in the fight against African criminal networks and conflicts. We have confirmed 
from the findings that, corruption-control is the best governance tool in the battle against these 
phenomena. Hence, it will be interesting to also devote space to explaining the intuition 
behind this finding; which is consistent with Asongu & Andrés (2013) on the role of 
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corruption-control as the best governance mechanism in the battle against African software 
piracy.  
In comparison to other governance tools, corruption-control has the greatest edge in 
tackling African criminal networks and conflicts for two main reasons: a ‘conceptual’ 
explanation and; an ‘end-game’, a ‘final-phase’ or a ‘last resort’ status of corruption-control 
in the pragmatism of governance. Firstly, from a conceptual perspective, the degree by which 
a country’s citizens are able to participate in the political decision making process (voice & 
accountability), the stability of the government to political violence and terrorism (political 
stability and/or no violence), the capability of a government to implement effective policies to 
maintain credibility (government effectiveness), the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies that encourage private sector participation (regulation quality), 
the existence of a good legal system including property rights and enforcement of contracts 
(rule of law), the existence of a form of government in which all eligible citizens have an 
equal say in decisions that affect their lives (democracy) and, a system of government in 
which one person has absolute powers  (autocracy); are not as important as the degree to 
which public power is diverted from private gain (control of corruption) in the fight against 
criminal networks and conflicts.  
Secondly, among the governance tools, corruption-control is the most important for 
the battle against the scourges of crime (and conflicts) because; it is like the ‘end game’, 
‘final-phase’ or ‘last resort’ in the fight against criminal networks. Leaders maybe voted into 
office by a majority of the population after engaging in vote-buying (quasi-democracy), the 
voted leaders may formulate rules by the legislature but catching people publicly violating the 
rules depends of the incorruptible character of security officers (police networks), even 
enforcements by the courts via sanctions on those caught in criminal activities is also 
contingent on the incorruptible nature of the judges. Above all, only in the absence of 
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corruption can real leaders be voted, genuine laws passed by the legislature and, law 
enforcement officers drag caught criminals to courts and, judges inflict appropriate sanctions 
on those caught to deter the scourges.  
As a policy implication, our results broadly indicate that, the waves of conflicts and 
crime in the African continent could be addressed to a certain extend if the fight against 
corruption is taken seriously by governments of sampled countries. Such corruption-control 
efforts will go a long way not only to improving the quality of life and wellbeing of citizens 
(by protecting their lives and property from criminals), but will also create ideal conditions for 
sustainable economic growth.  Ultimately, the measure will prevent organized criminal groups 
from corrupting, colluding with and/or penetrating state structures.  
Two caveats have been retained from the analysis: the correlation-oriented 
interpretation of the findings and, issues with the perception-based government quality 
indicators. Firstly, the results should be treated as correlations not causality owing to the 
cross-sectional nature of the analysis. Due to constraints in data availability, we have only 
been able to use a cross-sectional data structure. Panel data estimation techniques can only be 
employed in the coming years, when enough degrees of freedom in time series properties 
entitle us to.  Secondly, good governance indicators are perception based measures that may 
be subject to substantial bias owing to media propaganda. We have not been able to address 
issues resulting from the state of the data for two main reasons: on the one hand, as far as we 
have reviewed, there are currently no better good governance indicators than those proposed 
by the World Bank; on the other hand, finding instruments for an Instrumental Variable 
estimation approach has been tough and seriously hampered by the data structure
4
.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Had the data structure been panel, we would have used the first difference and/or lagged levels of the 
exogenous variables as instruments to tackle the endogeneity issue resulting from reverse causality and 
measurement errors in the perception-based governance indicators.  
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5. Conclusion   
 
Crimes and conflicts are seriously undermining African development. This article has 
assessed the best governance tools in the fight against the scourges. The following findings 
have been established. (1) Democracy, autocracy and voice & accountability have no 
significant negative correlations with crime. (2)  The increasing relevance of government 
quality in the fight is as follows: regulation quality, government effectiveness, political 
stability, rule of law and corruption-control. (3) Corruption-control is the most effective 
mechanism in fighting crime (conflicts). The findings are significantly strong when 
controlling for age dependency, number of police (and security) officers, per capita economic 
prosperity, educational level and population density.  
As a policy implication, our results broadly indicate that, the waves of conflicts and 
crimes in the African continent could be addressed to a certain extend if the fight against 
corruption is taken seriously by governments of sampled countries. Such corruption-control 
efforts will go a long way not only to improving the quality of life and wellbeing of citizens 
(by protecting their lives and property from criminals), but will also create ideal conditions for 
sustainable economic growth. Ultimately, the measure will prevent organized criminal groups 
from corrupting, colluding with and/or penetrating state structures. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
       
 Panel A: Summary Statistics   
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
  
Dependent 
Variable 
Crime (Conflict)  2.802 1.075 1.000 5.000 38 
       
 
 
Governance 
Independent 
Variables   
Political Stability (No violence) -0.655 0.983 -3.202 0.907 38 
Corruption-Control  -0.678 0.571 -1.726 0.929 38 
Government Effectiveness  -0.768 0.617 -2.255 0.523 38 
Rule of Law -0.739 0.638 -2.479 0.652 38 
Regulation Quality  -0.672 0.646 -2.469 0.524 38 
Voice & Accountability  -0.796 0.685 -1.997 0.545 38 
Democracy  2.756 3.851 -8.250 9.000 38 
Autocracy  1.809 3.197 -8.250 9.000 38 
       
 
 
Control 
Variables   
Police 2.171 1.041 1.000 5.000 38 
Age  72.219 16.427 33.981 98.925 38 
GDP per capita (log) 2.019 0.157 1.609 2.337 38 
Education  102.91 21.796 33.000 151.69 38 
Population Density 67.299 88.409 2.748 424.31 38 
       
 Panel B: Presentation of Countries (38) 
 Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, The Gambia, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia, Libya.  
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis   
               
 
Crime  
Governance Tools Control Variables  
PolSta CC Gov.E RL RQ V&A Demo Auto Police Age GDPpc Educ Pop  
1.000 -0.777 -0.591 -0.411 -0.619 -0.500 -0.289 -0.145 -0.310 -0.077 0.142 0.027 -0.334 -0.080 Crime 
 1.000 0.669 0.581 0.764 0.665 0.516 0.374 0.327 0.137 -0.218 -0.130 0.439 -0.025 PolSta 
  1.000 0.902 0.908 0.849 0.670 0.445 0.165 0.285 -0.374 0.063 0.391 0.189 CC 
   1.000 0.925 0.903 0.629 0.348 -0.050 0.123 -0.396 0.129 0.276 0.193 Gov.E 
    1.000 0.927 0.671 0.441 0.205 0.279 -0.367 0.034 0.386 0.115 RL 
     1.000 0.723 0.434 0.139 0.200 -0.252 -0.048 0.351 0.170 RQ 
      1.000 0.706 -0.262 0.108 0.072 0.105 0.207 -0.009 V&A 
       1.000 0.0160 0.027 0.008 0.079 0.367 0.024 Demo 
        1.000 0.075 -0.270 -0.141 0.342 0.051 Auto 
         1.000 -0.271 -0.269 -0.054 -0.087 Police 
          1.000 0.178 -0.171 0.113 Age 
           1.000 0.111 0.206 GDPpc 
            1.000 0.441 Edu 
             1.000 Pop 
               
PolSta: Political Stability. CC: Corruption-Control. Gov. E: Government Effectiveness.  RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality.  V&A: Voice & Accountability. Demo: Democracy. Auto: 
Autocracy.  GDPpc: GDP per capita. Educ: Education. Pop: Population density.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Crime  Crime  Level of  Organized Conflict (Internal)  Institute for 
Economics and 
Peace (IEP) 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by 
elites and private interests.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Democracy  Demo Institutionalized democracy World Bank (WDI) 
    
Autocracy  Auto Institutionalized autocracy  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Police  Police  Number of internal security officers and police per 100 000 
people.  
 Institute for 
Economics and 
Peace (IEP) 
    
Age  Age Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age population) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpc Logarithm of GDP per capita  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Education  Educ School enrollment, primary (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population  Pop Population density (people per sq. km of land area) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   
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